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Abstract In June 2001, the Chinese Government announced proposals to reduce 
its retained ownership in listed Chinese state-owned enterprises. In the three 
months following the announcement, the market fell by 40% and as a 
consequence, in 2002 the programme was cancelled. The Government learnt 
lessons and in April 2005 it launched a revised plan to sell its shares, known as 
the Full Circulation Reform. The new reform was carefully guided by official 
document releases, trialled with a pilot programme, and then extended to the 
majority of firms in groups over a two year period. The process was known as a 
gradual, offer-to-get approach. At the firm-level, each reforming company 
gradually implemented the sale of its Government-held shares through one 
negotiation stage and one voting stage. Part of the negotiation stage centred on the 
compensation that would be paid by the Government to the public shareholders to 
ensure that the reforms went through. This paper investigates market reactions 
around the critical event dates in the reform process and the underlying dynamics. 
The results show that this reform had positive impact on prices, indicating the 
gradual and offer-to-get approach was very successful and Government objectives 
for the sale were met.   
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1 Introduction  
When the Chinese stock markets were established in the early 1990s, including 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SHSE and SZSE), 
two thirds of China domestic shares were held by the central Government or their 
representatives and only about one third were issued to public investors. 
Government shares in listed companies could not be traded publicly while 
otherwise identical shares were freely-traded. This split-share structure led to 
conflicts of interest between tradable (public) and non-tradable (Government) 
shareholders and was recognized as the source of many corporate governance 
problems in China (Wang and Chen 2006; Guo and Keown 2009). Furthermore, it 
has been argued that Government-owned shares had a negative impact on the 
performance and the value of listed firms (Qi et al. 2000; Sun et al. 2003; Bai et al. 
2004; Wang et al. 2004; Chi et al. 2005). These governance problems, together 
with a desire to raise funds and move China towards a market economy, provided 
the incentive for the Government to propose to release its retained shares to the 
market.  
On 12th June 2001, State Council issued a regulation entitled Provisional 
Measures on Management over the Reduction of State Shares to Raise the Social-
security Fund [Measures (2001)] aiming to reduce the state shares in listed state-
owned enterprises (SOE) and detailing the programme to reduce Government 
stock. The proposals were unsuccessful as the market collapsed under severe price 
pressure. It was no surprise, given over 90% of the listed firms were SOEs and 
almost 67% of the shares were held by the Government.1  
The minority public owners feared that a large-scale sale of Government assets 
was imminent although the Government emphasized it was a mere proposal (Kim 
et al. 2003; Wong 2006; De Jonge 2008; Hou 2010) and no firm took real action 
to reduce the Government ownership under this proposal. Furthermore, the 
majority owners were not happy with the scheme of equal pricing, as they 
believed the Government shares were overvalued and an equal pricing mechanism 
would transfer wealth from tradable shareholders to non-tradable shareholders 
(Beltratti and Bortolotti 2006). Moreover, the uncertainties over when this would 
happen and how many shares would be sold also concerned the investors (Green 
2003). The Government was aware of these issues and scrapped the proposals in 
2002.  
In 2005, the Chinese Government launched the Split-Share Structure Reform 
(SSSR) as a revised plan to sell their stake in the listed companies. This time the 
Government adopted a gradual, experimental and bottom-up approach. The 
reform was carefully guided by the official document releases, trialled with a pilot 
programme, then extended to the firms in groups. At the firm-level, each firm 
undergoing SSSR was allowed to design its own proposal instead of using a one-
fits-all plan. For each firm, the plan was gradually implemented through two 
stages, where trading in shares was suspended during consultation and voting 
periods. The majority of Chinese listed SOEs successfully completed the reform 
over a two-year time period. By the end of 2007, 1,254 firms were successfully 
restructured to be fully listed, representing over 97% of the market capitalization 
by number of firms at the time.  
As part of the proposals for the listing of the tradable shares, the Government 
introduced a unique offer-to-get approach. The Government, as the non-tradable 
                                                 
1 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the average Government ownership of listed firms 
peaked in 1993 (75.6%) but reduced to 63.9% in 2004.  
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shareholders, had to pay compensation, called Consideration, to the tradable 
shareholders in each company, in order to implement the reforms. In other words, 
the Government compensated these shareholders for the estimated loss that they 
would suffer due to the sale of the Government shares. The aim of the 
Consideration was to ensure that market stability would be maintained. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the market reactions to the macro official 
Government announcements which guided the reform and to the critical firm-
specific announcements. The event-study method is used to analyse how this 
gradual and offer-to-get approach affected the market. A few previous studies 
have examined the market reaction to the share reform (Beltratti and Bortololli 
2006; Lu et al. 2008; Ren et al. 2009; Firth et al. 2010). However none of them 
looked at the complete reform process. Instead, researchers cherry-picked 
particular event dates, focusing either on stock price changes only at the first 
official document release to formally launch the SSSR [Notice (2005)], or the 
beginning of the firm-specific reform process (the 1st resumption day).2 As such, 
the previous literature has provided an incomplete picture. In this paper, we 
extend the literature by investigating market reactions during the entire reform 
process for each firm, including three Government announcements, one group 
date which announced the set of firms to be privatised at that time, and two firm-
specific events. In addition, previous papers have applied the event-study method 
somewhat arbitrarily. The choice of estimation periods, event periods and 
statistical tests varied across studies and was not explained. As a consequence, the 
studies lacked a convincing and plausible illustration of the application in the 
context of Chinese stock markets, which weakened the power of their results and 
conclusions. In this paper, discussions and justification of the key elements in the 
event-study are provided, such as the choice of event period, estimation period, 
return model, market index and statistical tests, as well as the removal of 
confounding events. This rigorous modelling helps to ensure the validity of the 
results obtained.  
Furthermore, in this study explanatory variables including issue size, 
compensation size, negotiation period, group order are regressed against the 
market reactions around each event date to measure their impact. Among them, 
group order has never been investigated before. Negotiation period stands for the 
efforts made by the non-tradable shareholders to solicit opinions from the tradable 
shareholders to reach an agreement. The more effort made by the non-tradable 
shareholders to communicate with the tradable shareholders, the less surprise the 
announcement made later would bring to the market, regardless of whether it was 
a negative or positive surprise. Overall, the research provides a comprehensive 
investigation of the entire SSSR process in China and thus it contributes to our 
understanding of the process, whether it was successful and whether such a format 
could be employed by other Governments looking to sell their holding in listed 
SOEs.        
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The detailed background of 
the SSSR scheme and producers are introduced in Section 2; the data and research 
design, as well as hypotheses are discussed and developed in Section 3; the results 
are presented and discussed in Section 4, finally a conclusion is presented in 
Section 5.  
                                                 
2 Details are provided in section 3.  
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2 China Split-Share Structure Reform  
2.1 Background 
On 29th April  2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
promulgated the Notice on the Trial Implementation of Measures on Split-Share 
Structure Reform for Listed Companies and Related Questions [Notice (2005)], 
which aimed to float to the stock markets the non-tradable shares retained by the 
Government. In other words, all the shares would be sold freely on the stock 
markets.This announcement was widely regarded as a formal launch of the SSSR, 
the final step in China SOE reform3.    
2.1.1 The Split-Share Structure 
Since the establishment of Chinese stock markets in the early 1990s, Government 
shares, which comprised almost two thirds of Chinese domestic shares, were not 
allowed to be traded publicly while otherwise identical shares, which are sold to 
the public investors, were freely-traded. 
This resulted in a structure of non-tradable shares and tradable shares, which is 
normally referred to as the split-share structure. By 2005, there were 1381 firms 
listed on two Chinese exchanges, of which 92% were former SOEs. No SOE in 
China was completely privatised.4     
The split-share structure is not unique to China. In the past, Governments across 
the world didn’t tend to fully privatise an entire SOE or even a controlling stake at 
the first time of listing (Jones et al 1999)5. Proponents argued that Governments 
tended to privatise a smaller proportion of such firms at the beginning because 
they wanted to send a credible signal to the market that they, as the largest 
stakeholders, were not expropriating shareholders’ wealth (Perotti 1995), with the 
high equity retention by the state signalling the Government’s confidence in the 
company, like a business guarantee (Mok and Hui 1998). Opponents to the 
structure criticised it from the corporate governance perspective. They argued that 
many controlling shareholders treated listed enterprises as cash cows from which 
they could benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders (Tenev and Zhang 
                                                 
3 China SOE Reform is a centerpiece of the overall Chinese overall reform of transforming from a centrally 
planned economic system to a market-oriented system (Liu and Gao 1999). From 1949 to 1979, the 
Government controlled all major sectors of the economy and formulated all decisions about the use of 
resources and the distribution of output. Planners decided what should be produced in accordance with 
national and social objectives. SOE executives were appointed and dismissed by the Government and usually 
treated as Government officials (Liu and Gao 1999). Since the 3rd Plenum in 1978, Chinese SOEs have been 
gradually given more and more autonomy to take control themselves, dealing with relevant rights and 
responsibilities. However, SOE executives were not fully responsible for any losses in their companies. This 
situation aggravated the moral hazard problem and led to increasing losses reports in many China SOEs . The 
policy of Zhuada fangxiao (grasping the large and letting go of the small) in the early 1990s had successfully 
privatised the failing and smaller SOEs through restructuring, selling and mergers, while some relatively 
strong medium and large-sized SOEs were selected to be transformed into publicly listed firms on the 
Chinese stock market. The Government didn’t sell all of the shares in the SOEs at once. They cautiously 
retained a substantial ownership in the listed SOEs. In general, two thirds of Chinese domestic shares were 
held by the central Government through state asset management agencies or by their SOE representatives. 
Only about one third were issued to public investors.  
4 A further split in the structure arose through the denomination of A shares that were available uniquely to 
Chinese investors, and B shares that were available uniquely to foreign investors. Government shares were 
categorised therefore as non-tradable A shares (NTAS). Tradable shares could be further divided into tradable 
A shares (TAS) and tradable B shares (TBS). This paper is concerned only with the A-share market and A-
share owners as the B-share market and owners weren’t affected by the sale of Government shares. 
5 For instance, the UK retained controlling ownership in some of the SOEs at the first sale in 1980s, when 
decentralization sparked and swept around the UK , an extreme example market-oriented privatization in 
JMNN (1999)..  
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2002). 6 Evidence of conflicts of interest has also been found between the owners 
of NTAS and the TAS in China (Tenev and Zhang 2002; Wang and Chen 2006; 
Guo and Keown 2009). Green and Liu (2005) further argued that legal protection 
for shareholders in China improved little in the 1990s because the regulators were 
under the influence of the local Governments that wanted to maintain a low level 
of legal protection for the average shareholders in order to enable the listed SOEs 
to reap the benefits of expropriations created by a weak legal framework. 
Empirical evidence showed that the Chinese Government shares had a negative 
impact on the performance and the value of listed SOE firms (Qi et al. 2000; Sun 
et al. 2003; Bai et al. 2004; Wang et al. 2004; Chi et al. 2005). 
Generally speaking, corporate governance issues due to the partial privatisation 
were more serious in China than in other countries. It may be because the listed 
SOEs were dominant on the Chinese stock markets while there were fewer in 
quantity on other stock exchanges. In particular, as time elapsed, these governance 
problems began to outweigh the Government guarantee, and this, together with a 
desire to raise funds and to move to a market economy, provided the incentive for 
the Chinese Government to propose to release its retained shares to the market.  
2.1.2 The first attempt to sell Government assets publicly 
The first attempt by the Government to sell publicly its shares in listed companies 
took place in June 2001, marked by the issuance of Measures on Administration 
of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (2001) [Measures (2001)], 
which outlined the proposed privatisation. Though published in a favourable 
macro-economic environment, this announcement caused the markets to plummet. 
The main indices on the SHSE and SZSE exchanges fell dramatically (about 40%) 
after the announcement and the bear market persisted for a long time (Hou 2010). 
It was such a disaster that even the 9-11 attack around the same time didn’t cause 
the US markets to fall to the same extent. The S&P 500 and the FTAS declined by 
15.47% and 16.48% respectively within three months after 12 June 2001, around 
half the decreases witnessed on the China stock markets over the same period.7 
This is consistent with Hou (2010) that the US and UK markets greatly 
outperformed China markets. 
The Chinese Government cancelled the proposal in 2002 and no firm was actually 
privatised. The Government realised that the first trial step was too fast and too 
reckless in a transitional economy.   
This unsuccessful attempt indicated that a premise to carry on the reform of 
reducing Government ownership needed to adopt a gradual and cautious approach 
to deal with the TAS owners in order to protect their interests and rights.8 
2.1.3 Did the Chinese Government give up? 
Kazakevitch et al. (2005) argued that the Chinese reforms were gradual in the 
macroeconomic sphere but sharp in the microeconomic sphere, in terms of “the 
                                                 
6 Such as obtaining soft loans from listed firms; using listed firms as guarantors to borrow money from banks, 
and buying and selling goods, services and assets at unfair prices 
7 Data calculated from DataStream.  
8 Since the very start of economic reforms in China in1978, the Chinese Government has played an important 
role. Many economists argued that China's success demonstrated the superiority of an evolutionary, 
experimental, bottom-up approach over the comprehensive and top-down "shock therapy" approach that 
characterized the transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (McKinnon 1994, Jefferson and 
Rawski 1995 and Sinchen 1997). However, the 40% fall in the markets in three months after the 
announcement of Measures (2001) indicated that it was apparent that the announcement of privatisation at 
this time shocked the stock markets and the investors.   
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boldness of the reforms and the rapidity of the changes China has made in moving 
to a market economy, which has exceeded that attempted in most countries” 
(Kazakevitch et al. 2005, page 70). This time the Chinese Government showed the 
“boldness” and determination to sell the retained Government shares with a 
meticulous attention to detail. 
In early 2002, the CSRC promulgated a Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies [Code (2002)], which was mandatory for all listed companies to 
follow, and which put the protection of shareholders’ rights as the basic goal of 
corporate governance. Code (2002) required listed companies to adopt proxy 
voting and cumulative voting methods9 if necessary to increase the voting power 
of the TAS owners in order to encourage shareholder activism.   
On 1st Feb 2004, the State Council issued Some Opinions of the State Council on 
Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets [Opinions 
(2004)], the third article of which noted that the intention was to ensure that the 
Government would be “actively and reliably resolving the problem of separation 
of equity ownership and trading rights.”10 Opinions (2004) burdened the CSRC 
with a compulsory task to solve the separation of TAS and NTAS. Under the 
pressure, Dr Shang Fulin, Chairman of CSRC, frequently gave public speeches in 
addition to meetings and discussions with relevant important parties throughout 
2004.  
On 7th December 2004, the CSRC issued Strengthening the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders Several Provisions [Provisions 
(2004)], which proposed that listed companies’ major business decisions, such as 
asset restructuring and equity-for-debt plans, should win majority votes (>50%) 
from voting by public shareholders (both TAS and TBS) in the general 
shareholders’ meeting, and required listed companies to provide on-line voting 
platforms for shareholders’ meetings11, given China’s vast territory made it 
difficult for many investors from dispersed geographic location to attend 
shareholders’ meetings in person.  
From early 2002 to Dec 2004, the Chinese Government spent almost three years 
setting up a regulation system to protect the interests and rights of the TAS 
owners and simultaneously showed the “boldness” and determination to complete 
the sale of Government shares. All this foreshadowed a come-back plan envisaged 
by the Government to sell their ownership in the listed SOEs.   
2.2 The come-back plan 
On 29th April 2005, the Chinese Government announced the SSSR, marked by the 
release of Notice (2005).  
The SSSR repackaged the Government’s asset sales programme in line with the 
improved regulation system that has been introduced as a result of the failed 
attempt in 2001, which aimed to protect the interests and rights of the TAS 
owners.  
                                                 
9 Cumulative voting is a type of voting process that helps strengthen the ability of minority shareholders to 
elect a director. This method allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee for the board 
of directors when the company has multiple openings on its board. In contrast, in "regular" or "statutory" 
voting, shareholders may not give more than one vote per share to any single nominee.  
10 The separation of equity ownership refers to the separation between the tradable and non-tradable shares. 
Tradable shares have trading rights while non-tradable shares don’t. It also stated that “When resolving this 
issue, the solution must respect market laws, contribute to the stability and development of the market and 
genuinely protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, in particular public investors.” 
11 However, more work needs to be done to promote the understanding of on-line voting among investors and 
increase the turnout rate (statistics show that those who have voted on-line represent no more than 10% of the 
tradable shares of the company). 
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In implementation, the Government took a gradual and cautious approach as it 
always did12 and also adopted an unprecedented offer-to-get approach, by 
“offering” Consideration (compensation) to the TAS owners “to get” the right to 
sell its ownership.13 
There were four event dates at the Government level.  
From April 2005 to September 2005, the Government made three announcements 
[Notice (2005), Guideline (2005) and Measures (2005)] to launch the SSSR, 
introduce a pilot programme and finalise an exemplary process. All the listed 
SOEs on the Chinese Stock Markets implemented the SSSR sequentially in 
groups.14 The Group lists (Group Announcements) were announced by the CSRC.  
2.2.1 Notice (2005) 
Notice (2005) introduced a pilot programme and proposed relevant issues in line 
with Opinions (2004), with objectives concerning the stability and healthy growth 
of the market and protection of the lawful rights and interests of public investors. 
Notice (2005) also set out the timescale of an individual reform process which 
should include two suspension stages. The first stage was a negotiation stage 
during which the holders of TAS and NTAS15 discussed the reform proposal. The 
second stage was a voting stage during which the tradable shareholders had an 
opportunity to vote on the agreed reform proposals at a shareholders’ meeting. 
Each stage was marked by a suspension day and a resumption day. In addition, 
Notice (2005) granted the holders of TAS the equally weighted voting rights as 
the holders of NTAS and put trading restrictions on the sale of Government shares 
                                                 
12 China adopted a gradual, evolutional approach to the transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy since its overall reform started at the end of 1978. This approach has often been said to “piecemeal, 
partial, incremental, often experimental, especially without large-scale privatisation” (Lin 2004). The gradual 
approach was also applied in the SSSR. 
13 It is not uncommon for the Government to pay a premium to the public investors in order to secure their 
proposals. When privatizing SOEs by selling the ownership on the stock markets, governments across the 
world usually underpriced shares of SOEs more than in private equity offerings (Jenkinson and Mayer 1988, 
Jelic and Briston 1999, Choi and Nam, 1998, Ljungqvist et al. 2000).             
14 There were 1345 SOEs involved. The reform process took place in orderly groups. In total, there were 66 
groups. 
15 The holders of TAS are public investors who own the tradable shares, including domestic and foreign 
institutional investors as well as Chinese individuals. Foreign investors were forbidden to purchase Yuan-
denominated "A" shares before 2002. But the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) program 
launched in 2002 allowed licensed foreign investors to buy and sell "A" shares. The holders of NTAS are the 
government owners of non-tradable shares. The holders of TAS and NTAS were on opposite sides of the 
negotiating table bargaining for a better deal for their own groups during the first suspension period. But the 
two groups had different objectives. According to Firth et al. (2010), the government had strong incentives to 
complete the reform smoothly and quickly while institutional investors, mainly mutual funds, were keen  to 
bargain for better terms in the reform package, and individual shareholders were likely to be free-riders 
(Davis and Kim 2007). 
In some ways, the situation is similar to a union/management negotiation. One group, traditionally considered 
weak in bargaining power relative to the other group, takes certain actions against the “strong group” who 
then has to face the “weak group” squarely at the negotiating table. In 2001, the relatively weak TAS holders 
dumped their shares, resulting in a disastrous and persistent market slump when the relatively strong 
Government attempted to sell 10% of their shares. In a similar vein, a union may organize a strike amongst 
relatively weak employees to coerce the relatively strong managers to negotiate over the terms proposed by 
them. 
In the SSSR negotiation, the Government NTAS in each firm brought the reform proposal to the table (see 
Figure 3) to discuss and negotiate with the TAS holders, indicating that the Government is eager and anxious 
to get a deal from the TAS holders rather than the other way around. The Government spent almost three 
years setting up a regulation system to “flatter” the TAS owners because the Government is “bold” and 
“determined” (Kazakevitch et al. 2005) to complete the sale of shares. In a negotiation, it is more likely the 
pursed has more bargaining power than the pursing as it is easier for the pursed to leave the table, Particularly 
the TAS holders have been given the voting right to say “No” if they didn’t like the deal. The evidence is 
72% of the sample companies (430 out of 599) revised their compensation ratios upwards by 4.7% after the 
negotiation. 
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after the reform. It was designed to maintain market stability and protect minority 
interests and thus it was expected to offset the oversupply price pressure. 
2.2.2 Guidelines (2005) 
On 8th May 2005, the SHSE, the SZSE and the China Securities Depository & 
Clearing Corporation Limited issued Operational Guidelines for the Pilot Reform 
of the Listed Companies16 [Guidelines (2005)]. Guidelines (2005), which was 
based on Notice (2005), specified the operational procedures from the 1st 
suspension to the 2nd resumption for the pilot reform programme, including the 
layout of the reform brochure.   
According to Guidelines (2005), a reforming firm should suspend immediately 
(1st suspension) once selected by the CSRC and then communicate with the TAS 
owners regarding the reform proposal. When the proposal was ready, the firm 
should apply to resume trading (1st resumption). The firm should suspend again 
(2nd suspension) one day before the scheduled registration date of the shareholders’ 
meeting. Once the reform proposal had received no less than two thirds of the 
votes from both the holders of TAS and NTAS, the firm should publicise the 
proposal and at the same time apply to resume trading (2nd resumption). 
The pilot programme, directed by Guidelines (2005), contained two pilot groups.              
On 9th May 2005, the CSRC invited the first group of four companies to the pilot 
programme (pilot 1). On 20th June 2005, the CSRC initiated the second pilot 
programme involving 42 companies worth 10% of the SHSE and SZSE stock 
market capitalisation (pilot 2). 
2.2.3 Measures (2005) 
On 5th September 2005, the CSRC issued the Measures on administration of split 
share structure reform of listed companies [Measures (2005)], the first official 
document providing details about the implementation of SSSR. The CSRC also 
required that all firms should finish their reform by the end of 2006.  
Measures (2005) followed the principles established in the pilot reform.17 In 
general, there was nothing new in this announcement but it summarised the pilot 
programmes and used them as a best practice. 
The reform took place in orderly groups.18 By the end of 2006, the reform had 
taken place with 64 regular groups (excluding the pilot programme) involving 
1290 companies that had either completed or were in the reform process.19 
2.2.4 Group Announcement 
The Group Announcement disclosed a portfolio of firms. This was determined in 
two steps.  
First the stock exchanges set a deadline to accept reform proposals from 
companies wishing to participate. Next the stock exchanges examined all the 
                                                 
16 The full Chinese text is available on 
http://www.chinasecurities.xinhua.org/gqfz/zcfg/t20050509_674933.htm. 
17 It decentralized decision-making at the firm level, by allowing shareholders to bargain over the method and 
terms of the compensation. Furthermore, it safeguarded the interests of TAS holders by seeking no less than 
two thirds of the votes from the TAS owners, compensating them for the estimated loss due to the reform, 
diluted the risks by introducing a series of announcements dates, prevented market slump by banning any sale 
of NTAS in the twelve months following the reform and restricted any issue size in the following twenty-four 
months. 
18 Please see Appendix 1 for the Group summary.  
19 The reform was not fully completed by the end of 2006 as the Government intended. There were 40 
“difficult” firms that did not successfully reform.   
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applying firms and removed those they thought had problems (for example, firms 
that didn’t meet their performance requirement). The selection standards could 
vary with the assumed future prospects of the firms, and were adjusted all the time.  
The selection process indicated that the companies in the name list were confident 
that they were well prepared for the reform, which was confirmed by the stock 
exchanges which carried out scrutiny of the submitting firms and assessed the 
feasibilities of their proposals. 
Figure 1 shows the process of the SSSR at the macro level.  
Figure 1: The step-by-step Government announcements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every firm involved had to negotiate with the public investors on the reform 
proposal in the first suspension stage and hold a shareholders’ meeting to allow 
the shareholders to vote for the reform proposal in the second suspension stage. In 
total, there were four event dates (two suspension dates plus two resuming dates) 
at the individual level. 
For each individual firm, a time scale was applied20: Pre-suspension  1st 
suspension t1st-sus 1st resumption t1st-res 2nd suspension t2nd-sus 2nd resumption 
t1st-sus 12 month lockup t12.   
                                                 
20  
1.Pre-suspension: A reform proposal should be submitted to the board of directors by a 
shareholder/shareholders holding individually/collectively two-thirds of the NTAS of the listed company. The 
board must seek the cooperation of an external underwriting institution and of a law firm to formulate the 
proposal.     
2.1st suspension: Once authorized by the CSRC, the firm information, together with the other firms 
authorized simultaneously, would be announced as a group (Group Announcement). The firm should suspend 
immediately, usually one day after the Group Announcement, publicize the initial reform proposal, including 
date of the shareholders’ meeting, a description of the reform proposal as well as the opinions of the 
recommending institution and the law firm. 
3. 1st resumption: Within 10 days after the 1st suspension, the board should assist the owners of NTAS in 
adequately communicating and negotiating with the holders of TAS. Approaches include for example hosting 
an investor symposium, a press conference or an online road show, paying a visit to institutional investors and 
issuing a consultation paper. In addition, the board of directors of the listed company should publicly disclose 
its hotline, facsimile and e-mail address in order to widely solicit opinions from tradable shareholders so as to 
lay a broad shareholder foundation for the reform plan. If the proposal was acceptable to both parties, an 
announcement of consensus would be made and trading should resume.  
4. 2nd suspension: The firm should suspend one day before the scheduled registration date of the 
shareholders’ meeting. 
5. 2nd resumption : Once the proposal won two thirds of votes from the NTAS holders and from the TAS 
holders, the firm should publicize the proposal and the “pass” result within two days, at the same time apply 
to resume trading. Once resumed, the reform was successfully implemented and the compensation would be 
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Figure 2 presents a typical timeline of reform process from preparation of a 
reform proposal to its implementation.  
Figure 2:  The timescale of the firm-specific events 
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2.3 Offer-to-get strategy 
The Government offered compensation, called Consideration21, as a sweetener to 
keep the TAS owners in the market so as to maintain the market stability.  
Consideration aimed to compensate the TAS owners for any estimated loss in the 
aftermath of the implementation of the reform. It played an important role in the 
reform package. The specific amount and type of Consideration varied from 
company to company as each firm was allowed to design its own proposal rather 
than a one-fits-all plan.  
Consideration took various forms, either in shares, in cash, in pre-assigned rights, 
or a combination of more than one type.22  
Consideration ratios varied across firms too.23 Many reform proposals did not 
provide a proper explanation of the calculation process, or they presented a 
proposed Consideration ratio without any explanation on how it was set.  
Li and Yang (2006) reported that the reform process had characteristics of 
diversified Consideration methods, various Consideration bases, unbalanced 
Consideration levels, and frequent adjustments.    
                                                                                                                                     
paid. If the proposal was rejected, the firm had to publicize a “fail” result within two days and apply to 
resume trading.  
6. A 12 month lockup period was established for the holders of NTAS. The initial 12-month lockup expired 
on t12 . Furthermore, in the two years after expiration of the lock-up, holders of NTAS with more than 5% of 
the total issued share capital of the listed company were further prohibited from trading on the stock exchange 
more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share capital within 12 (24) months. 
21 The term Consideration appeared in Measures (2005) in Article 16 in order to “implement the 
compensation plan specifically designed to balance the interests of each party in the split share structure 
reform” but was not specified in terms of the exact definition and meaning. 
22 Please see Appendix 2.1 for details.  
23 Appendix 2.1 gives details on the major approaches used by firms to calculate Consideration ratios.  
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In spite of the variation, Consideration took effect as long as it was approved by 
two thirds of the TAS owners and the NTAS owners respectively. 
This offer-to-get approach was regarded as innovative and unprecedented as it had 
never been observed elsewhere. However, a committed Government aiming for 
social and economic gains rather than the monetary proceeds from the issuances 
(Perotti and Guney 1993; Perotti 1995) may take costly action to signal its intent 
(Yarrow 1986). For instance, Governments across the world have underpriced the 
shares of SOEs in privatisation issuances by an average of 34.1% (Jones et al. 
1999) to 32.1% (Huang and Levich 1999). In contrast, private firms have 
underpriced the shares in conventional equity issuances by 10% to 20% 
(Loughran and Ritter 2002; Ljungqvist 2004). The evidence supports the fact that 
Governments are willing to pay more than is necessary to achieve social economic 
gains and the Chinese Government was no different.  
3 Research Design 
The classic method of the event study is applied in this paper to examine the 
market reactions on the relevant event days. The aim is to assess whether the 
gradual and offer-to-get approach reversed investors’ attitudes towards large scale 
sale of the Government assets and whether the SSSR could be viewed as 
successful.    
According to Campell et al. (1997), although there is no unique structure for an 
event study, event-study analysis can be conducted in five steps: (1) to define the 
event of interest and the event window, (2) to determine the selection criteria for 
the inclusion of a given firm in the study, (3) to model the normal returns so as to 
measure abnormal returns (ARs), (4) to define an estimation period to estimate the 
parameters of the normal performance model, (5) to design the testing framework 
for the ARs. Binder (1998) pointed out that the estimated ARs for sample firms 
were frequently used as the dependent variable in a regression with firm specific 
variables on the right hand side, indicating a sixth step: (6) to regress estimated 
ARs against potential factors.  
In the following sub-section, these six steps are discussed in the context of the 
Chinese SSSR.   
3.1 Events of interest 
The previous section detailed four event dates [Notice (2005), Guidelines (2005), 
Measures (2005), Group Announcement] at the Government level and four at the 
individual level [ sust 1 , resstt 1 , sust 2  and rest 2 ] in the SSSR, as shown in Figure 1 
and Figure 2. However some event dates are confounding with other event dates 
or impossible to identify due to the unavailability of data.24  
                                                 
24 For example, in Figure 1, Guidelines (2005) was announced on 8th May, the first working day after Notice 
(2005) was launched on 29th April, as there were eight public holidays in between, and the announcement of 
the first pilot group was one day immediately after Guidelines (2005). In addition, the sample companies 
staged reform in 66 groups spanning from 9th May 2005 to 31st Dec 2006. Firms arranged in the same groups 
started reform around the same time. The time interval between groups is 5 trading days. In the sample, on 
average 45 trading days were taken to complete an individual reform process, sufficiently long to allow 
another 9 groups to announce reforms. Previous studies have documented intra-industry information transfer 
between announcing and non-announcing firms in various settings such as earnings announcements (Foster 
1981, Freeman and Tse 1992), dividend change announcement (Firth 1996), security offerings (Szewczyk 
1992) and stock split announcement (Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello 2002). Prior research has also suggested 
that large firms’ reactions to common information lead those of small firms (Lo and MacKinlay 1990, 
Brennan et al. 1993, Asthanta and Mishra 2001), especially in assessing the stock prices of non-announcing 
firms in the business affiliate (Huang and Chang 2009), such as cross-shareholding of listed firms, which is a 
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The first pilot programme was announced only one day after Guidelines (2005) 
and should be able to incorporate its impact. Hence Guidelines (2005) is excluded 
as a confounding effect.25  
Two firm-specific suspension days ( sust 1 , sust 2 ) must be excluded due to non-
availability of data. The two resumption dates ( resstt 1 , rest 2 ) will be investigated.  
Consequently, there are three Government events of interest including Notice 
(2005), Measures (2005), the Group Announcement, two firm-specific events of 
interest including the first and second resumption dates.  
The unified lockup periods (12/24 months), required specifically by the CSRC for 
each firm involved, were announced as part of the reform proposal on 
resst
t
1
, 
voted and then publicized on 
res
t
2
. They were used by the Government to 
alleviate agency problems26 so as to help convince the TAS owners to approve the 
proposals (Liao, Liu and Wang 2011). Market response studies usually 
concentrate on the announcement day when new information is released, rather 
than the implementation day (Mikkelson and Partch 1985, 1986) or other event 
dates when no additional information is released (Scholes 1972, Xia et al. 2010). 
Therefore the market is expected to react to the implied information of lockups on 
the announcement days (
resst
t
1
,
res
t
2
) rather than on the expiration days (
m
t
12
,
m
t
24
). As a result, the two lockup expiration days are not included.27 
3.2 Event window 
The event window should be long enough to capture the significant effect of an 
event and at the same time effectively control for the confounding effects, but 
many empirical studies arbitrarily defined their long event windows without 
further explanation (McWilliams and Siege 1997).  
Confounding events are inevitable in the case of serial reforms.28 Considering the 
noise from confounding events, a short event-window is preferred.   
                                                                                                                                     
very common practice among China listed firms (Guo and Yakura 2009). In the scenario of China’s SSSR, 
those results suggest that firms which made earlier reform announcements could convey information about 
key elements in the reform proposal and process to those non-announcing firms within the same industry, or 
of smaller sizes, or closely connected, synchronously affecting their security prices at that time. As a 
consequence, there is scope for confounding events.  
25 The first pilot group announcement is included for investigation, thus the event date of Guidelines (2005) is 
excluded for redundancy. 
26 The lockups are proposed to signal firm quality to overcome adverse selection problems (Brav and 
Gompers 2003, Brau, Lambson and McQueen 2005) or to alleviate investors’ concerns about the moral 
hazard posed by insiders (Brav and Gompers 2003,Yung and Zender 2012). 
27 Empirical studies find significant negative market reactions around the IPO lockups (Field and Hanka 
2001, Bradley et al. 2001) and argue that the decline around the expiration day is partly due to price pressure 
and partly to worse-than-expected news about insider sales. These findings support the idea that the price 
movements around the IPO lockup are not relevant to the “lockup expiration” which was stated in the initial 
IPO prospectus, but due to the additional new information around the expiration day.  
Limited research has been conducted concerning the t12m and t24m dates, for example Liao, et al. (2011), 
who examined an event period of [-120, +20] days around the lock-up expirations. They noted that a large 
portion of the decrease in average CAR they found took place between day -120 and day -40 (and not at the 
lock-up expiration dates), with the CAR curve becoming flat after the lock-ups expire. They also documented 
that only around 4% of the firms chose to sell NTAS with 91 days after lockup. They suggested that negative 
returns are not likely to be caused by the post lock-up sales of NTAS.  
28 Please see Footnote 24 for details. An average interval between two consecutive groups is 5 working days, 
indicating an event window of (-5, +5) would involve confounding effects from two other group events. This 
is particularly the case since firms took an average of two months to complete the reform procedure. 
Therefore the outcomes of firms from a group within these two months could impact on other firms in the 
group. 
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Following Calomiris et al. (2010) and Lu et al. (2008), an event window of (-1, +1) 
is defined, subject to data availability. However, this had to be adapted in some 
instances.29 Table 1 summarises the event windows for all selected critical event 
dates.  
Table 1: The event windows for all the event dates of interest 
 
Event dates  Event window 
Notice (2005) on 29th April 2005 (-1, 0) 
Measures (2005) on 5th September 2005 (-1, +1) 
Group event-dates  (-1, 0) 
Two resumption dates (0, +1) 
 
3.3 Sample selection 
As reported in the China Securities Journal (1st January 2007), 1,305 out of the 
1,345 target companies were successfully restructured within 66 groups, including 
two pilot groups. No subsequent group was announced. All the firms tried at least 
once to implement the reform. Those which failed the first time could come back 
and start a new round of proposals to restructure. The remaining 40 firms were 
actually problematic and considered outliers.30 
The initial sample consisted of 840 companies with the availability data.31 The 
final sample consisted of 599 companies for the following reasons: 
 Firms that were aged or listed less than two years prior to 29th April 2005 were 
deleted.32 
 Firms were back-door listed33 within two years prior to the announcements of 
SSSR were removed.34  
 Exceptional firms that didn’t conform to a general SSSR prospectus were 
removed.  
                                                 
29 For example, the day after the Notice (2005) release was Saturday, 30th  April 2005, followed by a seven-
day Pubic holiday called Labours’ Day from 1st May till 7th May. 8th May 2005 was a Sunday. Therefore the 
first trading day after Notice (2005) issuance was 9th May 2005, which overlapped the announcement of the 
first pilot group. Consequently the event window for Notice (2005) is (-1, 0).  
Usually each firm in the group would suspend trading one day subsequent to the group event-date, 
announcing the start of its reform and publicizing its initial proposal. As a result, an event window of (-1, 0) 
applies for group announcements except that the event window for the first pilot group is the event day, 
Monday 9th May 2005.  
There is no data available before the two firm-specific resumption dates; hence an event window of (0, +1) 
applies in this situation. 
30 These firms tried at least twice or even three times to enter the reform process but they still failed. 
Therefore they are considered extreme examples.  
31 Sina Finance records the process and operation of China Split-share Structure reform at firm-level, 
including reform proposal, critical dates and other details in implementation. Datastream provides trading and 
market data. Resset Database is China’s leading provider of financial databases and software solutions for 
financial and investment research, where firm characteristics information is constructed in a standardized 
format. 
32 Because data processing in an event-study requires at least two years of consistent data prior to China 
SSSR. The two years are essential to estimate the normal returns without the reform, which is discussed in 
detail later. 
33 A back-door listing company is seeking listing on exchanges by acquiring an already listed company. A 
back-door listed company may alter the core business of the previous one and thus lead to a discontinuity and 
inconsistency in firm data. 
34 Back-listing replaces a listed firm with a new entry. The data of the replaced firm has little connection with 
that of the replacing firm other than the listing code. In other words, a firm newly back-door listed is no 
different from a firm newly-listed except that the former inherits an already-existent listing code while the 
later is allocated a new code. Therefore a back-door listing history within two years indicates no consistent 
data is available. 
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3.4 Measuring ARs 
A number of approaches are available to calculate the normal return of a given 
security and then to generate ARs.35  
Since Fama, Fisher, Jenson and Roll (1969) [Fama et al. (1969)], the OLS market 
model has been widely accepted in event studies to estimate the normal return and 
the AR, (for example Mikkelson and Partch 1984, 1986, Loderer et al. 1991, 
Errunza and Miller 2003). 
In this paper, the OLS market model is used as normal return model to predict 
ARs.
 
The OLS market model is a statistical model which relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfolio:
 mtiiitit
RR   where
 it
  is the 
zero
 
mean disturbance term.36 This method controls for the risk (market factor 
beta) of the stock and the movement of the market during the event period. 
The sample companies were listed either in the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. It has been suggested that a broad-based stock index should be used 
for the market portfolio (FFJR 1969; Binder 1998). Therefore SHSE A-Share 
Index and SZSE A-Share Index were selected for firms listed in SHSE and SZSE 
respectively.  
3.5 Estimation period 
Once a normal performance model has been selected, the parameters of the model 
must be estimated using a subset of the data known as the estimation window.  
Defining a proper estimation period usually raises three questions: (1) how many 
days should be included in the estimation period; (2) whether pre-event or post-
event days should generate the estimation period; and (3) how to remove the 
possible noise from confounding events in the estimation period?  
3.5.1 Length of estimation period 
There is no consensus on an optimal length of estimation period in the literature 
on event studies. The choice of estimation period is somewhat arbitrary (Aktas 
2007). By convention, the estimation period usually lasts for one year (around 240 
trading days).37 
Another line of literature considered beta stationarity associated with estimation 
period length. Baesel (1974) depicted the stationarity of individual betas as an 
increasing function of the estimation period length. The literature supports an 
estimation period longer than one year, in order to achieve beta stability.38  
                                                 
35 In the literature, ARs have been measured as (1) mean-adjusted returns (2) market-adjusted returns, (3) 
OLS market mode: deviations (prediction errors) from the market model, (4) deviations from the one factor 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or (5) deviations from a multifactor model, such as the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT). 
36 Parameters are estimated using an estimation period sample with OLS regression. The parameter estimates 
and the event period stock and market index returns are then used to estimate the ARs.  
37 For example, the estimation period is from day -245 till day -6 relative to the event day (Ball and Brown 
1980, 1985), the year ending 50 days before the event (Fama and French 1993), from day -250 till day -21 
prior to the event (MacKinlay 1997), from day -250 to day -51 (Pojezny 2006), from day -250 to day -30 
(Atkas 2007), from day -244 to day -6 (Ahern 2009), from day -200 to day -3 (Huang and Chang 2009) etc.. 
38 Roenfeldt et al. (1978) investigated the effect varying the length of the second sub-period on the stability of 
individual security betas and found 4-year period estimation period was most reliable. Theobald (1981) 
showed that beta stationarity increased with the calendar period length but did not increase indefinitely. He 
suggested an optimal estimation period of 180 to 210 months for U.K. monthly data. Daves et al. (2000) 
concluded that a much shorter estimation period of two to three years was more appropriate for financial 
managers to use when estimating beta with daily returns. Diacogiannis and Marki (2008) showed that the 
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Xia et al. (2006), in a study based on Chinese daily data, suggested an estimation 
period of 2 years.39 Therefore, in this study, the estimation period will comprise 2 
years, as a compromise between the requirement of beta stationarity and the 
conventional preference of one year estimation period.    
3.5.2 Neutralising the risks of information leakage 
Considering the impact of information leakage (or rumours) before the 
announcement, Aktas et al. (2007) suggested 30 days can usually be excluded 
between the end of the estimation period and the beginning of the event period to 
neutralize the impact. In this paper, thirty days prior to the event day were 
excluded, consistent with this recommendation.  
3.6 Aggregation of ARs 
The AR observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for 
the event of interest.  
To aggregate across securities and through time, it is assumed that there is no 
correlation across the ARs of different securities.40 
Given a sample of N  securities, the individual securities’ ARs can be averaged as: 

N
itt
N 1
1
 where t is the sample average of the N  AR on day t . 
Then this sample average can be aggregated through time
 
using the same 
approach for an individual security. Define )( 21 ttCAR   as the cumulative average 
AR from 1t
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1
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t
t
tttCAR  .  
3.7 Hypotheses 
The events of interest in this study are the release of Notice (2005) and Measures 
(2005), the group announcement of the list of companies, as well as the 1st and 2nd 
firm-specific resumptions of trading. These events comprise the complete reform 
process for each firm.  
The hypotheses are built around the critical event dates. There is one main 
hypothesis for each event date studied. The event-study method is applied to 
estimate the average AR and the statistical tests are then used to examine whether 
it is significant or not. Each main hypothesis is presented with sub-hypotheses 
relating to various factors. Cross-sectional multiple-regressions are run to 
establish whether the factors have significant impacts on the firm-specific ARs.  
Notice (2005) aimed to alleviate the conflicts between the TAS and NTAS holders 
and to protect the TAS owners from the oversupply of shares.    
Hypothesis 1: The average AR is zero. 
Hypothesis 1.1: The issue size is negatively related to the firm-specific AR. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
utilization of an estimation period of three years captured most of the maximum reduction in the standard 
error of beta estimated as compared to other periods with Athens stocks. 
39 They found that the mean of beta was the closest to 1 for an estimation period from 1.5 to 2 years starting 
from 1.5 years after the interested event. The smallest standard deviation came with an estimation window of 
2 years starting from 6 weeks after the event of interest. 
40 Statistical tests can be performed to adjust for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Please see 
section 4. 
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The companies which suffer more from agency problems are expected to welcome 
the Notice (2005) announcement. 41      
Hypothesis 1.2: Agency problems are positively related to the firm-specific AR. 
 
Measures (2005) summarised the pilot programme and used it as a best practice to 
reiterate the determination of the Government to protect minority interests and 
hence may have a positive impact on the market.  
Hypothesis 2: the average AR is positive. 
 
Group Announcement indicated that the companies selected were self-confident 
and their performances were confirmed by the CSRC.  
Hypothesis 3: the AR is positive. 
 
As Jiang et al. (2008) and Li et at (2010) indicated, the firms in earlier groups 
were more self-confident than those in later groups and may have faced stricter 
scrutiny as the stock exchanges always tried to set examples in earlier groups for 
future reforms in later groups.            
Hypothesis 3.1: the group order is negatively related to the AR. Firms that went 
first would have higher ARs.  
 
The 1st resumption day implied that ideally the reform proposal disclosed should 
reflect a mutual agreement between the holders of TAS and NTAS, therefore 
should no surprise or response is expected from the market.  
Hypothesis 4: The AR is zero. 
Hypothesis 4.1: The AR is not related to Consideration size. 
Hypothesis 4.2: The AR is not related to Consideration type. 
 
The negotiation period varies across firms. During the negotiation period, the 
board of directors should assist the owners of NTAS in adequately 
communicating and negotiating with the holders of TAS using a variety of 
approaches42. If the proposal is acceptable to both parties, an announcement of 
consensus will be made and trading resumes (the 1st resumption date), which puts 
an end to the negotiation period. 
Therefore the number of TAS owners contacted and their opinions sought should 
be positively related to the negotiation period. A short negotiation period may 
indicate the NTAS owners and firms made less effort and thus conducted an 
insufficient communication with the owners of TAS.  In a shorter negotiation 
period, there may be some TAS holders who were not informed and who did not 
have the opportunity to respond to the proposals publicized.   
Hypothesis 4.3: The negotiation period is negatively related to the squared ARs.43 
The 2nd resumption day implied a positive impact on the markets as the 
compensation would be paid and the reform was successfully finished.  
                                                 
41 Agency problem here refers to the conflicts between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders and therefore is proxied by the ratio of non-tradable shares to tradable shares.  
42 The approaches include hosting an investor symposium, a press conference or an online road show, paying 
a visit to institutional investors and issuing a consultation paper. In addition, the board of directors of the 
listed company should publicly disclose its hotline, facsimile and e-mail address in order to widely solicit 
opinions from tradable shareholders so as to lay a broad shareholder foundation for the reform plan. 
43 Initially proposed by Beaver (1968), the squared ARs were used in many studies to measure the size of the 
ARs regardless of the sign, such as Landsman and Maydew (2002).    
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However the price behaviour on ex-dividend day has been widely observed to fall 
by approximately the amount of dividend, which suggests that the price at the 2nd 
resumption of trading may drop by the amount of the Consideration. 
Hypothesis 5: The AR is negative. 
Hypothesis 5.1: Consideration size is negatively related to the AR.  
4 Results and Analysis 
This section presents and discusses the market reactions to the different event 
dates, as well as the regression results.44  
4.1 Events of interest at the Government level 
Table 2 presents the event effects in terms of the ARs and cumulative ARs (CAR) 
over the event windows45 around the events of interest at the Government level. 
The results of three significance tests are provided as well46. The regression 
results are provided in Appendix 4.1 and 5.2.  
Table 2: The ARs and CARs around the event dates at the Government level 
 
Part A: Notice (2005) AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) 
Average 0.006 -0.003 0.003 
BW 1.449 -0.686 0.441 
MP 8.512** -3.713** 10.582** 
Rank 1.698* -0.726  
Sample size 599 599 599 
Part B: Measures (2005)  AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (-1, 1) 
Average 0.01 0.012 0.008 0.03 
BW 2.49* 2.988** 1.992* 4.312** 
MP 14.256** 17.162** 11.931** 24.974** 
Rank 0.873 1.297 0.937  
Sample size 553 553 553 553 
Part C: Group Announcement AR(-1) AR(0) CAR (-1,0) 
Average 0.005 0.008 0.013 
BW 1.353 1.922* 1.891* 
MP 8.295** 11.486** 11.396** 
Rank 0.714 1.220  
Sample size 599 599 599 
A test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% level 
while those with two stars (**) indicate significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
 
The Mikkleson and Partch (MP) test is designed to adjust for time-series 
dependence but assuming cross-sectional independence. The Brown and Warner 
                                                 
44 Only selected results are shown and analysed in this article. Please see Appendix 4 for the full regression 
results. 
45 Please refer to Table 1.  
46 Please refer to Appendix 3 for more details. 
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(BW) test is designed to control for cross-sectional dependence but assuming 
time-series independence.  
The events of interest at the Government level are supposed to simultaneously 
affect many companies and subsequently the cross-sectional dependence over the 
event windows could be large, which casts doubt on the highly significant results 
obtained with the MP test. The results from the MP test should be used with 
caution.  
The problem of time-series dependence is not serious, indicating that the BW test 
is more reliable than the MP test.  
The non-parametric rank test examines whether the position of the ARs in event-
window are significantly away from the centre position over the combined period 
(estimation period plus event period). As the rank test is free of distribution and 
does not require independence across securities or over time, it provides a robust 
alternative to BW and the MP tests.47 
4.1.1 Notice (2005) 
In Table 2 Part A, the average AR across securities on the day before the release 
of Notice (2005) is positive (0.6%) and significant at the 1% level according to 
the MP test and at the 5% level according to the rank test but insignificant 
according to the BW test. The rank test suggests there is probably some 
information leakage.  
On the event day, the average AR is -0.3%. Both the BW test and the rank test 
report insignificance, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
The average CAR over the event window (-1, 0) is 0.3%, insignificant according 
to the BW test, which also supports Hypothesis 1.  
The movement from the positive return on day -1 to negative return on day 0 
indicates that investors were initially drawn towards the good news with regard to 
protecting minority interests but then there was a downward reaction as investors 
contemplated the negative news of large sales of NTAS. Together this led to a 
statistically insignificant effect.  
In Appendix 4.1, the coefficient of issue size is negative (-0.09) but statistically 
insignificant due to a p-value of 0.56, indicating the market was not sensitive to 
the price pressure from selling the NTAS, thus leading to a rejection of 
Hypothesis 1.1. It may be that the trading restrictions eased the investors’ fear of 
the Government dumping shares. Lu et al. (2008) found a significant negative 
effect. However there are some flaws in their choice of event window and 
estimation window which may impair their results.48 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1.2, agency problems have a statistically significant 
and positive relationship with the ARs, indicating that the TAS owners welcomed 
the announcement. Lu et al. (2008), using a sample of companies included in the 
China Securities Index 300, found a significant negative effect during their event 
period (-1, 0), one day before 29th April 2005, attributed it to the fear of a dilution 
effect based on past experience in 2001 even though the Chinese Government was 
promising to protect the minority traded shareholders. They used an estimation 
                                                 
47 Appendix 3 explains the three tests in detail.  
48 Companies were suspended from the start day of the individual reform and there was no trading for a 
while, indicating there was no price available on that day (event day) and the subsequent day. They didn’t 
explain how they managed to calculate the 2-day and 3-day CARs around the individual company’s 
announcement to commence the reform, in the absence of data. Second their event window and estimation 
window overlapped on day -1 relative to the event day. This may affect the estimation of parameters and 
calculation of t statistics, leading to biases in results.   
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period of only 6 months before the event which may bias their estimations of 
parameters and the final results. The China Securities Index 300 comprises the 
largest 300 companies listed on Chinese stock markets, which may also affect 
their results as larger companies may be more vulnerable to the reform.       
4.1.2 Measures (2005)  
This event day has never been considered in the literature. It led the reforms for 
all the remaining firms which were not involved in the pilot programme and 
should be carefully investigated.  
In Table 2 Part B, the sample size is reduced from 599 to 553 as the firms in the 
pilot programme are excluded. 
The ARs are 1%, 1.2% and 0.8% on day -1, day 0 and day 1. According to the 
BW test finds, the ARs are significant at the 5% level on day -1 and day 1 and 
significant at the 1% level on the event day, which leads to a rejection of the null 
of no abnormal performance and an acceptance of Hypothesis 2. The positive ARs 
persist over the 3-day event window, indicating that the information was leaked 
before the event day and remained at a significant level after the event day.  
These ARs on single days in the event window are significantly different from the 
estimated mean of zero according to the parametric BW and MP tests. But the 
nonparametric rank test doesn’t report any significance, indicating the ranked-
positions of these single-day ARs are not significantly different from the centre 
position (the mean rank) over the combined period which covers both estimation 
period and event window. 
The average CAR (-1, 1) is 3%, significant at the 1% level in both the BW test 
and the MP test, indicating the null of no abnormal performance is rejected at the 
release of Measures (2005), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Investors 
seemed to react positively to the efforts made by the CSRC to show its 
determination to protect minority interests.  
4.1.3 Group announcement 
Table 2 Part C shows the average AR at various group announcements, associated 
with tests of significance. 
Firms in the same group were announced on the same day, which indicates that 
event-clustering is inevitable and the MP test may reject the null too frequently.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the 2-day event-window CAR (-1, 0) is 
significantly positive (1.3%) at the 5% level according to the BW test. The AR is 
0.5% on day -1 and insignificant, indicating there is no information leakage. The 
event-day AR is 0.8%, reported significant at the 5% level by the BW test. The 
rank test doesn’t report significance of the single-day ARs on day -1 and day 0, 
indicating the ranked-positions of these two ARs are not statistically far from the 
ranked-position of the medium.  
The results suggest that the investors were happy with the news that their firms 
were in the final list. Figure 3 shows the average CAR (-1, 0) curve at the 66 
group announcements. 
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Figure 3: The average CAR curve at the group announcements 
 
 
 
Generally speaking, this CAR curve is volatile with a maximum above 6% and a 
minimum below -4% while the average CAR (-1, 0) is positive (1.3%), consistent 
with the findings in Ren et al. (2009). What is clear is that there is no pattern in 
the time series to suggest that there was any learning through time from the 
successful implementation of the scheme. 
From Appendix 4.2, the group order has a coefficient close to zero (0.00005) and 
is insignificant due to a p-value of 0.653, which rejects Hypothesis 3.1. The 
investors did not see later entry into the reform as an indication of lower self-
confidence. Ren et al. (2009) also reported a positive CAR around group 
announcement. 
4.2 Events of interest at the firm specific level  
Table 3 shows the ARs and the CARs around the firm-specific resumptions of 
trading, associated with the significance tests results. The regression results are 
presented in Appendix 4.3, 5.4 and 5.5.  
 
Table 3: The ARs and CARs around the event dates at the firm-specific level  
 
Part A: The 1st resumption day AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average 0.031 0.012 0.043 
BW 7.819** 2.957** 6.222** 
MP 44.281** 17.499** 35.593** 
Rank 2.952** 0.852  
Part B: The 2nd resumption day AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average -0.14 -0.006 -0.145 
BW -34.826** -1.395 -20.912** 
MP -205.068** -7.755** -122.612** 
Rank -5.853** -1.341  
A test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% level 
while two stars (**) indicate significance at the 1% level 
BW: Crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: Time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
 
The resumption day varies from company to company since it is firm-specific, 
indicating the event-clustering may not be that serious. But event-clustering is still 
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not uncommon.49 Therefore the MP test which does not control for cross-sectional 
dependence should still be used with caution. 
4.2.1 The 1st resumption day 
The AR on the event day is 3.1%, which is significant according to all three tests. 
The AR on day +1 is 1.2%, significant according to the BW test and the MP test, 
indicating the event effect persists after the event day. The rank test statistic 
suggests insignificance which means the ranked-position of the AR is not 
statistically significantly different from the ranked-position of the median. The 
CAR (0, 1) is 4.3%, significant with the BW test and the MP test. Conclusively, 
Hypothesis 4, which predicts zero abnormal performance, is rejected. The 
publication of the reform proposal on the 1st resumption day, which should be a 
mutual agreement between the holders of TAS and NTAS, is actually a positive 
surprise to the market. In other words, there were uninformed investors, possibly 
non-participating investors who didn’t participate in the discussion. The reform 
proposals, especially the level of Consideration, offered more than was expected.  
Significant positive returns at 1st resumption day have been observed by other 
scholars too, such as Beltratti and Bortololli (2006), Lu et al. (2008) and Firth et al. 
(2010). 
In earlier studies, Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) argued that the expectation of 
improved corporate governance outweighed the price pressure from the large-
scale non-tradable-shares disposals and thus resulted in positive returns. This was 
a strange argument given that the process was not about improved governance 
rather it was about protecting the interests of minorities.   
Lu et al. (2008) argued that investors reacted positively due to the inclusion of 
compensation in this reform process. However they later found no relation 
between the level of Consideration and share market response, suggesting that 
investors perceived the Consideration to be fair and adequate, which contradicted 
their argument.  
Firth et al. (2010) argued that the final terms of the compensation were better than 
expected and/or there was a palpable relief that the firm could now move forward 
and management could concentrate on improving operating performance. They 
also found the Consideration level is a significant and positive determinant of the 
announcement effect. Their conclusion can be viewed as a combination of 
Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) and Lu et al. (2008).  
Ideally, investors should agree on the reform proposal before the 1st trading 
resumption. Also due to the lock-up period, no government shares could be traded 
at this stage. In this sense, there should be no surprise in the market. But all the 
empirical results so far have demonstrated that the market did respond positively 
at the 1st resumption day. This suggests that the results were dominated by TAS 
investors who did not have the opportunity to respond to the consultation and who 
found the proposals to be more beneficial than expected. 
This explanation is supported by the findings in the regression analysis. In 
Appendix 4.3, it is shown that the negotiation period has a significant and 
negative relationship with the ARs, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4.3. The 
shorter negotiation period, the less effort made by the NTAS owners to 
communicate with the TAS owners, the stronger the market reaction to the 
                                                 
49 (1) Firms in the same group may have great chance to share the same 1st resumption day; (2) The five-
working-day group interval may increase the chance for firms in different groups to have the same 1st 
resumption day. For instance, 599 sample companies have 207 1st resumption dates. On average,, 
approximately every 3 sample companies share the same 1st resumption dates. 
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information disclosed at the 1st resumption day. Lu et al. (2008) also produced 
similar findings.  
In addition, the Chinese stock market is labelled as a “highly-speculative” market 
(Wong, 2006) where there are many short-run arbitragers. The positive response 
from the non-participating investors may be exaggerated by temporary speculative 
behaviour in the market.     
In Appendix 4.4, the adjusted Consideration ratio50 has a positive (0.034) but 
insignificant (p-value = 0.42) coefficient, which means there is no relationship 
between the level of Consideration and share market response. In other words, the 
investors perceived the Consideration to be fair and adequate, consistent with 
Hypothesis 4.1 and findings of Lu et al. (2008). However Firth et al. (2010) 
reported a significant and positive coefficient. They focused on firms that have 
offered shares as the sole Consideration and selected an estimation period which 
only included 60 trading days. Therefore their conclusion may be biased. 
Furthermore the Consideration type didn’t affect the market reaction at the 1st 
resumption day either, consistent with Hypothesis 4.2. Lu et al. (2008), however, 
reported a significant relationship. But their sample size was too small to be 
convincing.51  
4.2.2 The 2nd resumption day     
The AR is -14% on the event day, significant at the 1% level according to all three 
tests. On day +1, this negative return almost vanished, with -0.6% insignificant in 
both the BW test and the rank test. The CAR (0, 1) of -14.5% is dominated by the 
negative AR on day 0 and is significant according to both the BW and the MP test.  
Generally speaking, the result supports Hypothesis 5.  
This critical final date has previously been missed in previous studies of the China 
SSSR, possibly intentionally because it seems bizarre to have a negative return of 
such magnitude. Only Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) talked about this large 
decline on the 2nd resumption day and argued it was due to stock trading from the 
ex-bonus record date, which was quite obscure. They provided no further 
explanations or evidence. 
As Hypothesis 5 indicates, the return should fall by the amount of Consideration, 
but the decline may be reduced by the positive effect of the good news implied on 
the 2nd resumption day, the successful completion of the reform plan. The 
difference between the estimated AR based on Consideration and the true AR is 
the premium, which reflects the real market response.  
The average adjusted Consideration level is 0.29552 share for every TAS held, 
which indicates a decline in return by 22.78%53 and leads to an estimated AR of -
23%54. The real AR on the 2nd resumption day is -14%. Therefore there is an 
approximate premium of 9%. The empirical results are consistent with the 
implications of Hypothesis 5.  
Moreover, as shown in Appendix 4.5, the Consideration ratio has a negative 
coefficient (-0.758), which is significant at the 1% level due to a very small p-
                                                 
50 Appendix 5 lists formulas to adjust Consideration ratios in different styles to equivalent bonus shares.  
51 Lu et al. (2008) included 3 sample companies which paid Consideration in cash, 1 sample company which 
used warrant type and 22 sample companies which selected combination type, which indicates their results 
from Consideration type dummies are not very convincing. 
52 This number is in Appendix 4.4 and 5.5.   
53 The formula to compute the estimated return assuming a drop by Consideration: 
1)1(1)( 0  ii ConRE ; 
54 The formula to compute the estimated AR: 000 )()( miiii RREARE   .  
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value of 3.35E-08, consistent with Hypothesis 5.1. It indicates every one share 
Consideration would make the AR drop by 0.758%, an additional support of the 
view that the AR would fall by the approximately the amount of Consideration. 
4.3 A full story 
Figure 4 depicts the CAR curve following the timeline from the release of Notice 
(2005) by the CSRC, to the firm-specific completion of reform on the 2nd 
resumption day. The solid line represents the estimated CAR curve after adjusting 
the Consideration ratio and the dotted line represents the real CAR curve without 
any adjustment.  
 
Figure 4: CAR curve following the timeline   
 
 
 
At the 2nd resumption day, although the average CAR from the sample firms 
appeared to reduce (the dotted line) it actually didn’t. If the Consideration effect 
was removed, the market moved upwards instead (the solid line) and the 
estimated CAR was as high as 9%, which is the ultimate value of the SSSR and 
indicates a market success of the program. 
4.3.1 Summary of results 
At the first Government announcement [Notice (2005)], there was no distinct 
market reaction, which indicates that the aim of maintaining the market stability 
set by the Government was achieved. It was a remarkable success especially in 
comparison to the dramatic price drop after Measures (2001). 
At the second critical Government announcement [Measures (2005)], there was an 
average AR about 3%, indicating the market was optimistic after seeing the 
successful experiment in the pilot programme. 
At the group announcement, the AR fell to about 1%, indicating the market was 
calming down but still confident.  
At the 1st resumption day, the AR climbed up to approximately 5%, suggesting 
the TAS owners were not all involved in the negotiation. The reform proposals 
were greater than expected by the market. In other words, the Government 
appeared to be prepared to over-compensate the TAS owners.  
At the 2nd resumption day, the estimated CAR was as high as 9%, which was a 
perfect finish to the process.  
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Generally speaking, the total market was positive during the SSSR, in contrast to 
the market crash following the aborted effort in 2001 to reduce the Government 
shares.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the market reactions around all five critical event dates 
(three at the Government level and two at the firm-specific level) during the SSSR 
and identified the underlying dynamics. Previous studies have failed to investigate 
all announcements and consequently they have presented an incomplete picture of 
the reform process. Also in this paper, the event-study method is adapted to the 
context of Chinese SSR, modifying the arbitrary application in previous studies. 
The results show that the SSSR, with the aim of selling off the Government 
ownership in the listed SOEs, reversed the negative market reaction after the 
aborted proposals announced in Measures (2001). The Government learnt lessons 
from the failure. The interests and rights of the TAS owners were better dealt with 
and protected than in 2001. Overall, the objectives of the reform process (to 
protect market laws, contribute to the stability and development of the market and 
genuinely protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, in particular public 
investors) set by the Government in Opinions (2004) and Notice (2005), were 
achieved. It can be concluded that the SSSR was a success.  
The results demonstrate that both the tradable and non-tradable shareholders were 
indifferent to the Consideration size publicized in the reform proposal at the 1st 
resumption day, indicating the negotiation suspension stage worked effectively 
and led to a mutual agreement between the two parties. The firms with a shorter 
negotiation period (indicating less effort to communicate with the tradable 
shareholders) saw stronger market reactions, in either a negative or positive 
direction. Finally the firms in later groups didn’t learn from the earlier groups as 
examples, since the ARs around a sequence of group announcements fluctuated 
rather than followed a downward pattern.  
This paper contributes to the literature providing the latest empirical evidence  on 
the Chinese SSSR. It supports the view that a gradual and experimental approach 
is critical to the success of large scale reform in a transitional economy. The 
gradual approach which saw many successes in the Chinese overall reform proved 
to be very effective in the SSSR, which was carefully guided by official document 
releases, trialled via the pilot programme, then extended to the firms in groups 
over two years. At the firm-level, each reforming firm gradually implemented the 
SSSR through two stages.  
This paper also sheds light on the approaches the Governments should take to deal 
with difficulties in the financial crisis. The offer-to-get approach, never observed 
elsewhere, showed the determination and the intent of the Government to achieve 
social economic gains in the long run rather than short-term profits. Minimising 
the damage, solving perceived problems, maintaining the markets and stabilising 
society should be prioritised, even at a cost to the Government. Otherwise, if the 
proposals failed the Government and the whole country could end up paying 
much more to correct the mistake and solve the problem.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Details of the 66 reforming groups 
 
Group No. Group date Interval in days Group No. Group date Interval in days 
1 40 Sep 12 05 N/A 33 26 May 21 06 5 
2 32 Sep 18 05 6 34 30 May 28 06 5 
3 22 Sep 26 05 8 35 20 Jun 4 06 5 
4 23 Oct 9 05 13 36 21 Jun 11 06 5 
5 21 Oct 16 05 5 37 24 Jun 18 06 5 
6 18 Oct 23 05 5 38 36 Jun 25 06 5 
7 18 Oct 30 05 5 39 32 Jul 2 06 5 
8 20 Nov 6 05 5 40 8 Jul 9 06 5 
9 20 Nov 13 05 5 41 12 Jul 16 06 5 
10 17 Nov 20 05 5 42 8 Jul 23 06 5 
11 22 Nov 27 05 5 43 8 Jul 30 06 5 
12 19 Dec 4 05 5 44 9 Aug 6 06 5 
13 21 Dec 11 05 5 45 8 Aug 13 06 5 
14 27 Dec 18 05 5 46 6 Aug 20 06 5 
15 38 Dec 22 05 4 47 8 Aug 27 06 5 
16 19 Dec 30 05 5 48 8 Sep 3 06 5 
17 13 Jan 8 06 5 49 7 Sep 10 06 5 
18 24 Jan 15 06 5 50 5 Sep 17 06 5 
19 46 Jan 22 06 5 51 11 Sep 24 06 5 
20 38 Feb 12 06 5  52 6 Oct 8 06 14  
21 39 Feb 19 06 5 53 6 Oct 15 06 5 
22 49 Feb 26 06 5 54 7 Oct 22 06 5 
23 46 Mar 5 06 5 55 5 Oct 29 06 5 
24 25 Mar 12 06 5 56 7 Nov 5 06 5 
25 28 Mar 19 06 5 57 12 Nov 12 06 5 
26 41 Mar 26 06 5 58 14 Nov 19 06 5 
27 25 Apr 2 06 5 59 7 Nov 26 06 5 
28 16 Apr 9 06 5 60 10 Dec 3 06 5 
29 26 Apr 16 06 5 61 11 Dec 10 06 5 
30 35 Apr 23 06 5 62 12 Dec 17 06 5 
31 28 May 7 06 14  63 22 Dec 24 06 5 
32 23 May 14 06 5 64 32 Dec 31 06 5 
Source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/chinaggzw/index.shtml 
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Appendix 2: Consideration 
Appendix 2.1: Consideration forms 
Consideration took various forms and could be used in different combinations.  
The most popular forms are: 
• Shares Transfer (ST): the owners of NTAS give away certain NTAS to the holders of TAS. 
The existing investors of TAS receive free shares in proportion to their ownership in a firm 
from the corresponding owners of NTAS. But in ST, these shares are available to the existing 
shareholders for free and transferred from the NTAS instead of new shares. Effectively, an 
implementation of ST indicates a reduction of NTAS with zero revenues. Suppose an 
investor receives a consideration ratio of STC  per share held by the TAS owners and there 
are NT  non-tradable A shares and T  tradable A shares in a company, an application of ST 
can reduce the NTAS of this company by STCT   .  
• Cash Payment (CP): the owners of NTAS pay Consideration in cash to the holders of TAS. 
Under this approach, there is no change in the shareholding structure but at the cash cost of 
the NTAS owners. NTAS owners opting for this payment method didn’t want to give away 
the shares and instead they paid RMB CPC  per share the TAS owners own. In other words, 
they valued the shares that they would otherwise have paid under SP at CPCT  .  
• Recapitalization of retained earnings (RI): a listed company capitalizes its retained earnings 
and issue new equity shares. The owners of NTAS pay the holders of tradable shares the new 
equity shares they receive from the company. Under this approach, the number of total shares 
increases by )/1( RICNTT  times. Retained earnings capitalized are unavailable for 
future dividends. Therefore this approach is more of a wealth transfer from the future 
investors to the existing investors than from the NTAS owners to TAS owners.  
• European Put Warrants Transfer (PWT): the TAS holders have the right to put (sell) an 
underlying share to the NTAS holders at a certain strike price on or before a specified date at 
zero premium. Only when the exercise price ( PWTK ) is greater than the market price around 
the mature date ( maturityatP  ), will the put warrant be exercised. Under this approach, the 
NTAS owners are required to pay Consideration of )( maturityatPWT PKT  to the TAS 
owners on or before the expiry date. PWT protects the TAS owners when the market price 
falls below the exercise price. 
Usually a put warrant is sold at a certain price, which reduces the warrant holder’s payoff by 
the cost. However in the case of China SSSR, the transfer of put warrant to the TAS holders 
is free of charge. The profit range for the TAS owners is (0,
 PWT
K ) as the market price of 
share drops. Different from the approaches of ST, CP and RI, PWT brings the post-market 
factor into consideration.  
• European Call Warrants Transfer (CWT): The TAS holders have the right to buy the 
underlying share for an agreed price, on or before a specified date at zero premium. Only 
when the exercise price ( CWTK ) set up front is lower than the market price around the 
mature date ( maturityatP  ), will the call warrant be exercised. Under this approach, the NTAS 
owners are required to pay Consideration of )( CWTmaturityat KPT   to the TAS owners on 
or before the expiry date. CWT allows the TAS owners to share profits when the market price 
rises up above the exercise price.   
Like PWT, CWT is free of charge for the TAS holders and the profit range is (0, +∞) as the 
market price of share increases.  
• Share Split (SS): the owners of NTAS pay the holders of TAS the shares under their name 
from share split. A stock split increases the number of shares in a public company. Under this 
approach, the number of total shares increases by )/1( SSCNTT  times. Compared to RI, 
the firm value is the same while the par value of the stock decreases.  
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The payments through ST, RI and SS implied a reduced state shareholding while the others didn’t. 
RI and SS increased the number of total shares outstanding. RI increased firm value as well but SS 
didn’t. Except for CWT and PWT which indicated the use of a real post-event price in a certain 
period, the others estimated a post-reform price.  
Appendix 2.2: Valuation of Consideration 
The calculation of Consideration varied from company to company based on different assumptions. 
Many reform proposals didn’t provide a proper explanation of the calculation process or presented 
a proposed Consideration ratio without any explanation on how it was set. Li and Yang (2006) 
reported that FCR process has characters of diversified Consideration ways, various Consideration 
bases, unbalanced Consideration levels, frequent adjustments.  
Consideration was generally based on the assumption of a substantial price drop in the aftermath 
of the implementation of the reform. Each company thus estimated its price/earning ratio or NAV 
once all shares were tradable and calculated, 1st the loss the TAS owners would incur as a result of 
the share price decline and 2nd the number of bonus shares the NTAS holders would have to offer 
to in order to offset the loss. To illustrate, see the process below: 
1. 
posteventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
TPPLoss postpreTASfor   )(  where T is the 
number of tradable shares and NT is the number of non-tradable shares, preP  is the market 
share price before the event and postP  
is the market share price after the event. 
 
2. Suppose C  refers to the bonus share received for by each TA held, therefore 
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shares for every premarket TA held. This is the basic model for the calculation 
of Consideration.  
The valuation of Consideration depends on the estimation of postP , which, generally speaking, is 
determined by how each firm estimated its post-event P/E ratio or NAV.  
Various Considerations forms may differ in presenting Considerations but in general follows the 
idea that the value before and after the event should be the same and Consideration should 
compensate for the aftermarket loss to the TAS owners. Shown below are the theoretic valuation 
of Considerations for various Consideration forms (on per share basis) although in most proposals 
the details were not available.  
• Consideration for Share Transfer: 1
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• Derivation of Consideration for Share Split: 
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• Derivation of Consideration for Cash Payment: 
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In a proposal using PWT / CWT as Consideration, a strike price instead of a Consideration is 
provided. The potential aftermarket loss to the holders of TAS depends on the maturity price in the 
future ( maturityatP  ) rather than the market price immediately after the event ( postP ).  
• Derivation of Consideration for Put Warrant: 
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Appendix 2.3: Summary of the sample Consideration  
 
Consideration Plan Total % Average raw Consideration ratio  
Shares Transfer (ST) only 439 73.46 0.307 share per TAS  
Cash Payment (CP) only 6 1.00 ¥1.1 (≈ £0.073) per TAS  
Recapitalisation Issues (RI) only  92 15.19 0.58 share per TAS 
Put/Call Warrant Issues (P/C) only 1 0.17 0.8 share per TAS 
Share Split (SS) only 5 0.83 0.63 share per NTAS  
Combinations Total 56 9.36 N/A 
CP + P/C +ST  1 0.17 N/A 
CP +ST 27 4.51 N/A 
CP+RI 1 0.17 N/A 
RI+ P/C 3 0.50 N/A 
RI+ST 14 2.34 N/A 
P/C +ST 10 1.67 N/A 
Total 599   
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Appendix 3: Statistical tests 
There are three statistical tests employed in this paper.  
1. BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
2. MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
3. Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989)  
Even relatively moderate cross-sectional dependence could cause Type I errors (Salinger 1992, 
Aktas et al. 2007, Kothari and Warner 2007, Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). Event clustering is a big 
problem in the SSSR. The MP test, which assumes cross-sectional independence, therefore should 
be carefully treated when there is serious cross-sectional dependence.  
A large residual autocorrelation could lead to Type I errors. Figure below shows the histogram of 
the 1-day lag residual autocorrelations from the estimation periods for all the sample companies, 
with a step of 0.05.  
 
 
 
The sample autocorrelation converges around 0.025 with a maximum of 0.25. Generally speaking, 
the problem of time-series dependence is not very serious, indicating the BW test, which assumes 
time-series independence, may make fewer Type I error and is more likely to give better 
significance. 
The rank test examines whether the position of the ARs in event-window are significantly away 
from the centre position over the combined period (estimation period plus event period). As the 
rank test is free of distribution and doesn’t require independence across securities or over time, it 
provides a robust alternative to BW and the MP tests. 
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Appendix 4: The results of cross-sectional multiple regressions 
Appendix 4.1: The regression results for the event of Notice (2005) 
  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.011 0.044 0.256 0.798 
IS 0.002 -0.090 0.161 -0.561 0.575 
AP 1.771 0.004 0.002 2.248 0.025 
ST  -0.009 0.006 -1.542 0.124 
ID  -0.006 0.003 -2.025 0.043 
LP  -0.004 0.003 -1.325 0.186 
FS 21.22 0.00009 0.002 0.046 0.963 
CG 0.296 0.002 0.016 0.147 0.883 
EPS 0.168 -0.030 0.011 -2.871 0.004 
VOL 1.954 0.001 0.0004 2.486 0.013 
R Square: 0.042 
F statistic: 2.858*, significant at the 5% level.  
Regress Model 1:
 
ii
iiiiiiiNoticei
VOLEPS
FSCGSTIDLPAPISCAR
98
7654321




 
IS (Issue Size): the value of NTAS divided by the pre-announcement market capitalization;  
AP (Agency Problem): the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the agency problems between the 
TAS and NTAS holders; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, like 
A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period.  
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Appendix 4.2: The regression results for the event of Group Announcement 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.092 0.044 -2.093 0.037 
GO 0.00005 0.0001 -0.45 0.653 
ST -0.004 0.006 -0.679 0.497 
ID -0.001 0.003 -0.259 0.796 
LP 0.002 0.003 0.471 0.638 
FS 0.005 0.002 2.369 0.018 
CG 0.027 0.018 1.48 0.139 
EPS 0.005 0.012 0.46 0.646 
VOL 0.0004 0.0005 0.867 0.386 
R square: 0.0234 
F statistic: 1.768 
Regression Model 2:  
ii
iiiiiGroupi
VOLEPS
FSCGSTIDLPGOCAR
87
654321




 
GO (Group Order): the ascending order of groups, starting from the 1st pilot group ranked 1, 
ending up with the last group announced at the end of Dec 2006 ranked 66; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, like 
A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
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Appendix 4.3: The regression results for the event of 1st resumption (Part A) 
  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.008 0.001 6.445 0 
NP 17.656 -0.00008 0.00002 -3.61 0.0003 
OC 0.221 -0.003 0.003 -1.075 0.283 
GO  0.00002 0.00003 0.509 0.611 
ST  -0.001 0.002 -0.508 0.612 
ID  -0.002 0.001 -1.726 0.085 
LP  0.0004 0.001 0.354 0.723 
FS 21.22 -0.001 0.001 -1.015 0.311 
CG 0.296 0.004 0.005 0.693 0.488 
EPS 0.168 -0.006 0.003 -1.766 0.078 
VOL 0.018 0.00004 0.00014 0.296 0.768 
R square: 0.0383 
F statistic: 2.44**, significant at the 1% level 
Regression Model 3: 
iii
iiiiiiiresi
VOLEPSCG
STIDLPFSGOOCNPCAR
987
65433211
2




 
NP (Negotiation Period): the length of the negotiation period, measured in days;  
OC (Ownership Concentration): the logarithm of the number of shareholders;  
GO (Group Order): the ascending order of groups, starting from the 1st pilot group ranked 1, 
ending up with the last group announced at the end of Dec 2006 ranked 66; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, like 
A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
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Appendix 4.4: The regression results for the event of 1st resumption (Part B) 
  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.158 0.095 1.653 0.099 
CS 0.295 0.034 0.042 0.807 0.42 
CD  0.016 0.012 1.293 0.196 
ST  0.001 0.013 0.054 0.957 
ID  -0.013 0.007 -1.808 0.071 
LP  -0.001 0.007 -0.123 0.902 
FS 21.22 -0.006 0.004 -1.269 0.205 
CG 0.296 0.021 0.039 0.531 0.595 
EPS 0.168 -0.05 0.025 -1.97 0.049 
VOL 1.954 0.001 0.001 1.046 0.296 
R square: 0.019 
F statistic: 1.27 
Regression Model 4B: 
iii
iiiiiiresi
VOLEPSCG
STIDLPFSCDCSCAR
987
6543211




 
CS (Consideration size): adjusted on the same scale according to Appendix 5;  
CD (Consideration dummy): equal to 1 if Consideration is paid in cash, warrant, or combination 
including cash or warrant and 0 otherwise; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, like 
A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
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Appendix 4.5: The regression results for the event of 2nd resumption 
  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  1.028 0.294 3.504 0.0005 
CS 0.295 -0.758 0.135 -5.597 3.35E-08 
AP 21.22 -0.005 0.012 -0.373 0.71 
ST  -0.176 0.04 -4.398 1.30E-05 
ID  0.032 0.022 1.432 0.153 
LP  0.029 0.023 1.253 0.211 
FS 21.22 -0.039 0.013 -2.904 0.004 
CG 0.296 0.06 0.12 0.499 0.618 
EPS 0.168 -0.024 0.077 -0.311 0.756 
VOL 1.954 -0.00034 0.003 -0.108 0.914 
R square: 0.105 
F statistic: 7.685**, significant at the 1% level 
Regression Model 5: 
iii
iiiiiiiresi
VOLEPSFS
CGSTIDLPISAPCSCAR
1098
76543212




 
CS (Consideration size): adjusted on the same scale according to Appendix 5;  
AP (Agency Problem): the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the agency problems between the 
TAS and NTAS holders; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, like 
A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
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Appendix 5: Conversion of original Considerations ratios into equivalent 
shares offered (Formula) 
Consideration Plan Consideration Valuation  Equivalent shares offered 
Shares Transfer 
(ST)  
post
postpre
ST
P
PP
C

  STST
CC   
Recapitalisation 
Issues (RI)  
T
TT
P
P
C RT
post
pre
RI

  




 

T
TT
CC RTRIST  
Share Split (SS) 
SSpost
pre
SS
RP
P
C
1
  SSSSST
RCC   
Cash Payment (CP) 
postpreCP PPC   postCPST PCC   
Put Warrant Issues 
(PWT)  
maturityatPWT
maturityatpre
PWT
PK
PP
C




  if 
exercised  
PWTST CC   
Call Warrant Issues 
(CWT)  
CWTmaturityat
maturityatpre
CWT
KP
PP
C





 if 
exercised 
CWTST CC   
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